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STUDENT NOTES
TORTS-MALICIOUS

PROSECUTION

The Central Acceptance Corporation brought action to recover of
Katherine Rachal moneys alleged to have been due as the unpaid
balance of a series of notes executed by her and representing deferred
payments of the purchase price of an automobile, and also to foreclose a mortgage on the automobile, also alleged to have been executed
by Rachal to secure the payment of the notes.' Katherine Rachal,
in her answer, admitted the purchase of the automobile, but denied
having signed, executed or delivered the notes or mortgage mentioned In the petition, or that either the notes or the mortgage had
been assigned to Central Acceptance Corporation by the original
holder. Although she admitted paying two of the series of notes, defendant averred that such payments were made by her under duress
and fraud. Defendant also filed a counterclaim, alleging that the suit
brought by the plaintiff corporation was brought maliciously and
without probable cause, and was brought for the purpose of harassing,
embarrassing and humiliating defendant, and prayed damages for
mental anguish, humiliation and mortification caused by the suit, and
for costs and expenses incident to the suit. Plaintiff demurred to the
counterclaim, which demurrer the lower court overruled. Judgment
in the sum of $500.00 was awarded defendant, and plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the demurrer to the
counterclaim should have been sustained. The only reason suggested
by the defendant below why the demurrer should not have been
sustained was that the plaintiff was a non-resident, and if defendant
was not allowed to assert her purported cause of action for malicious
prosecution as a counterclaim in the suit brought by plaintiff corporation, she might not later, after termination of that suit, be able
to maintain her suit against such non-resident. While admitting the
general rule to be that termination of the suit in defendant's favor
must be alleged before an action of malicious prosecution can be
maintained,2 defendant sought to have an exception made to this
rule in cases where the plaintiff in such a suit is a non-resident. Defendant here sought to establish a ground for the making of such an
exception to the general rule by attempting to draw an analogy to the
rule that an action for unliquidated damages may be maintained as
a counterclaim where the defendant on the counterclaim is insolvent
or a non-resident of the state? As stated above, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky refused to recognize the suggested exception. Such ruling
1Central Acceptance Corporation v. Rachal, 264 Ky. 849 (1936).
'Wood v. Laycock, 60 Ky. (3 Metc.) 192 (1860); Graziani v. Ernst,
169 Ky. 751, 185 S. W. 99 (1916); Davis v. Brady, 218 Ky. 384, 291
S. W. 412 (1927); Feterly v. Gibson, 210 Cal. 282, 291 Pac. 411 (1930);
Shaeffer v. 0. K. Tool Co., Inc., 110 Conn. 528, 148 AtI. 330 (1930);
Harper on Torts, Sec. 269, page 584.
'Marks v. Grace, 205 Ky. 456, 266 S. W. 30 (1924); North Chicago
Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore, Etc., Co., 152 U. S. 596, 14 S. Ct. 710,
38 L. Ed. 565 (1893); Brown v. Pegram, et al., 149 Fed. 515 (1906).
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of the court seems to be in accord with all previously decided cases
on a similar point of law.
No case has been found which is directly in point with the instant
case. As stated by the Court of Appeals in its opinion, this contention
of the defendant is a novel one.'
Defendant attempted to discover an analogy between the rule
that an action for unliquidated damages may be maintained as a
counterclaim where the defendant on the counterclaim is insolvent
or a non-resident. But such an analogy is imperfect. Defendant had
no "unliquidated damages" until the suit brought by the plaintiff was
terminated in defendant's favor, for until such termination it could
not possibly be shown that there was not probable cause for the Institution of such suit. Then again, defendant seeks to go one step
further with the unliquidated damage rule than any case found applying that rule. She seeks to set up as a counterclaim a set of facts
which might, upon the happening of a future event (termination of
the present suit in her favor), ripen into a claim for unliquidated
damages. She is in much the same position as a man about to be
hit by a recklessly driven car. Such a man certainly has no cause of
action until he is hit. Here, if the action in which malicious prosecution was alleged to have occurred had terminated, defendant in that
suit would have a claim similar to cases where counterclaims for
unliquidated damages have been allowed against non-residents, in
order that such claims would not be lost because of inability to get
the non-resident before the court in a later suit
The proposed exception to the general rule would be a greater
departure from precedent and policy of the law than any court would
probably allow. The action of malicious prosecution is a type of
action not favored by the law, and suits of such nature have been
to some degree actively discouraged. Many courts refuse to allow an
action for malicious prosecution in civil cases, unless the party sued
suffers some interference, by reason of the suit, with his person or
his property.' No court encourages such an action based upon a civil
' Central Acceptance Corporation v. Rachal, 264 Ky. 849 (1936).
5Ball v. Rawles, 93 Cal. 222, 28 Pac. 937 (1892); Davis v. Brady,
218 Ky. 384, 291 S. W. 412 (1927); Bazzell v. Ill. Central Ry. Co., 203
Ky. 626, 262 S. W. 966 (1924). In 18 R. C. L., page 11, paragraph 2,
it is said:
"The action for malicious prosecution is not favored in law,
and hence has been hedged about by limitations more stringent
than those in the case of almost any other act causing damage
to another, and the courts have allowed recovery only when the
requirements limiting it have been fully complied with. The disfavor with which the action is looked upon is especially marked
in cases where the suit is being brought for the institution of
criminal proceedings against the plaintiff, as public policy favors
the exposure of crime, which a recovery against a prosecutor
obviously tends to discourage."
6Pye v. Cardwell, 110 Tex. 572, 222 S. W. 153 (1920); National
Stock Yards Nat. Bk. v. Valentine (Texas Civil App.), 39 S. W. (2d)
907 (1931); Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 51 N. E. 569
(1898); Peckham v. Union Finance Co., 48 Fed. (2d) 1016 (1931).
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suit, although some courts, including Kentucky, do allow them if
reputation is involved, or if the sole purpose of the suit is to annoy.
But in most cases where recoveries were allowed for malicious
prosecution in civil suits, the offending party had brought successive
suits upon the same cause of action. Therefore, it is doubtful if defendant's claim for damages for malicious prosecution would have
been allowed even if the termination of the suit could have been
alleged and proved, because of the hesitancy upon the part of all
courts to allow the maintenance of this type of action. In view of this
oft expressed disfavor to this type of action, a court would hardly be
justified in making an exception to the rule regarding termination
of suits simply because of the non-residency of a party and the consequent hardship upon the party sued to later maintain his possible
action for malicious prosecution.
Defendant would have had no cause of action if she had attempted
to bring an independent suit, rather than asserting her purported
claim as a counterclaim, before termination of the present suit. For
this reason the demurrer to the counterclaim should have been sustained. It is well settled that a counterclaim must be a cause of action,
and state all the necessary allegations of such cause of action, 8 and
here defendant had no cause of action for malicious prosecution until
the final termination of the present suit. For this reason, if for no
other, plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's counterclaim should have
been sustained by the court.
JAMES M. TEay.
VIOLATION OF A STATUTE

IN DETERMINING

NEGLIGENCE

In the recent case of Soutlern Mining Company v. Saylor,1 the
plaintiff sued for damages for injuries sustained by film when the
improperly supported ceiling of the mine room in which he was working fell on him. The plaintiff based his right to recover on the failure
of the defendant mine owners and mine foreman to comply with Kentucky Statutes 2726-4, which imperatively imposed upon the mine
foreman and the assistant mine foreman the duty of examining the
plaintiff's working place not less than two times a week while he was
working, and to see that his working place was properly secured by
props and timbers, and not to direct him to work in an unsafe place
except for the purpose of making it safe; and Kentucky Statutes
2726-7, which states that it shall be the duty of the mine foreman or
the assistant mine foreman of every coal mine in this state to see that
every person employed to work in such mine shall, before beginning
Pierce v. Thompson, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 192 (1828); Kolka v. Jones,
6 N. D. 461, 71 N. W. 558 (1897); Payne v. Donegan, 9 Ill. App. 566
(1881); Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134 N. D. 705 (1922).
Kelly v. Kelly, 1 Ky. Opin. 328 (1866); Rice v. Pulliam, 141 Ky.
10, 131 S. W. 1053 (1910); Griffith v. Dowd, 133 Minn. 305, 158 N. W. 420
(1916); Albrecht v, Dillon, 224 Ill. App. 421 (1922); Braden v. Gulf
Coast Lumber Co., 89 Okla. 215, 215 Pac. 202 (1923); J. M. Broat Lumber Co. v. Van Houten, 66 Mont. 478, 213 Pac. 1116 (1923).

